Abstract. The main aim of this paper is to study the propensity of consumer cooperatives (Coops) to use incentive schemes in situations of strategic interaction with pro…t-maximizing …rms (PMFs). Our model provides a reason why Coops are less prone than PMFs to pay variable bonuses to their managers. We show that this occurs under price competition when in equilibrium the Coop prefers to pay a ‡at wage to its manager relying instead on her intrinsic motivation, whereas the pro…t-maximizing rival adopts a variable, highpowered incentive scheme. The main rationale is that, by recruiting a manager whose preferences are aligned with the company goals (e.g., a consumer-owner), the Coop is per se highly expansionary in term of output. Therefore, the Coop does not need to rely on an externally hired manager who sets prices aggressively to expand market share and quantity. Furthermore, adopting a monetary reward based on sales and pro…ts leads to distorted incentives with respect to the Coop's goal, which after all is the welfare of its members. Michael Kopel, Department of Organization and Economics of Institutions, University of Graz, Graz, Austria. E-mail: michael.kopel@uni-graz.at.
Introduction
In this paper we contribute to the understanding of compensation practices in consumer cooperatives -a particular form of non-pro…t organizations -and try to shed some light on the di¤erences to their for-pro…t rivals. In particular, we provide a reason why a consumer cooperative (henceforth Coop) might be less prone than a pro…t-maximizing …rm (henceforth PMF) to pay variable bonuses to a manager and to rely on …xed wages instead. The key point here is that Coops and other nonpro…t …rms may have a preference to recruit managers who are intrinsically motivated to advance the …rm's organizational goal (e.g., Frey 1997 Coops are enterprises operating in the retail industry which, by law or statutory rules, should act on behalf of their consumer-members. 1 Since, ultimately, customers are the main Coop's stakeholders, they are commonly entitled to democratically elect their representatives, who participate in general meetings and, directly or indirectly -usually through a board of directors -recruit the CEOs running the …rm. The wide di¤usion of Coops worldwide suggests that this form of organizational governance is important. In 2008 more than 3,000 Coops were active in Europe with a turnover of approximately 70 billion Euro and 25 million consumer-members (EuroCoop 2008) . Also Japan reports a large number of consumer cooperatives, serving 25.8 million members and producing a turnover of approximately 30 billion Euro in 2009 (JCCU 2009). Switzerland, Finland, Italy, Spain, as well as many other European countries similarly possess well-established consumer cooperative movements. In recent years, the scale of operations of this type of …rms has reached a considerable dimension and most of existing Coops can be currently portrayed as enterprises competing oligopolistically with conventional PMFs, thus giving rise to a special form of mixed oligopoly. Richards et al. 1998) . Concerning CEO compensation, empirical work has repeatedly shown that -in contrast to PMFs -Coops do not provide high-powered incentives to their managers. For example, Hueth and Marcoul (2009) …nd that "... the cooperative governance structure is likely to result in less reliance on explicit performance incentives." (p. 1220). Instead, Coops seem to rely to a much higher degree on the intrinsic motivation of its managers and workers, on implicit contracts (enforced by social ties between the CEO and board members) and on subjective performance evaluation (Leete 2000 , Ittner et al. 2007 , Tirole 1994 ). Colter and Nolan (2006) …nd that compensation in Coops is mainly related to the size of the Coop and that contingent pay and bonuses are uncommon and small compared to the base salary. Colter (2011) remarks that, "..there are managers who much prefer to have not a bonus at all." Trechter and King (1995) discover that bonuses of Coop managers were mainly related to size measures like sales or total assets and less dependent on pro…tability. Trechter et al.
(1997) report that Coop boards are skeptical of ex ante bonus programs. These observations for CEO compensation in Coops are in line with the …ndings in the broader literature on (other) non-pro…t organizations, see e.g. Frumkin and Keating (2010) , Brandl and Güttel (2007) , and Hallock (2002) .
To motivate these …ndings, two main reasons have been advanced. First, from an agency perspective, using low-powered incentives for the managers in nonpro…t organizations is the board's optimal response since the objectives of a NPO are di¢ cult to quantify (Hallock 2002, Preyra and Pink 2001) . Since the goals are vague and ill-de…ned and the danger of giving dysfunctional incentives is high, the use of pay-for-performance is restricted (Theuvsen 2004 , Spear 2004 ). Additionally, in Coops the heterogeneity across members makes it di¢ cult to agree on performance targets, which results in low-powered incentives for CEOs (Hueth and Marcoul 2009 ). Second, from a management perspective, using low-powered incentives is indicated since pay-for-performance based on …nancial measures does not …t with a nonpro…t's mission (Frumkin and Keating 2010) . Strong extrinsic …nancial incentives are against the principle of fairness and might crowd out intrinsic motivation of individuals who have (been) selected to work in a non-pro…t organization (Spear 2004 , Theuvsen 2004 , Brandl and Güttel 2007 .
We believe that, although important, any explanation for low-powered incentives in Coops (and other nonpro…t organizations) which is based only on these two perspectives provides an incomplete description of the governance and behavior of organizations competing in oligopolistic mixed markets. The argument which we pursue in this paper is that product market competition and strategic interaction between …rms shape incentive contracts and governance as well. In the last years, several empirical papers have shown that this interaction plays an important role (e.g. Karuna 3 Therefore, the question remains why Coops would not want to use higher-powered incentive contracts to guide their managers'market behavior and to in ‡uence their rivals'expectations in oligopolistic interaction, but rather use …xed wage compensation. To the best of our knowledge, no formal work has addressed this strategic incentive issue. The only work worth mentioning is Feng and Hendrickse (2011) , who introduce a multi-tasking agency model and argue that Coops might have e¢ ciency advantages if interdependencies between upstream and downstream activities exist. At the end of their paper, they only brie ‡y address strategic incentive e¤ects, but provide no detailed analysis (see, similarly, Feng and Hendrickse 2009). In the present paper, we close this gap in the literature and analyze a strategic incentives game between a PMF and a Coop.
More precisely, we consider a Coop and a PMF interacting in a Bertrand duopoly with di¤erentiated goods (e.g. Marini and Zevi 2011, Drivas and Giannakas 2010, Fulton 2005, Fulton and Giannakas 2001) . Both the Coop and the PMF owners can either delegate the price choice to an externally recruited manager or, alternatively, select one of their own core stakeholders to run the …rm. For the Coop, such an internally selected manager might be one of the consumer-members, for the PMF one can think of an investormanager. Following the strategic incentives literature, we assume that if an external manager is recruited, her compensation is determined by an explicit performance contract based on 4 MICHAEL KOPEL AND MARCO A. MARINI observable and veri…able performance measures, in our case pro…ts and sales revenues. 4 The owners of the …rm (or the board) can design the manager's contract to obtain a competitive advantage in this situation of strategic interaction. 5 The results of our analysis are in line with empirical and anecdotal evidence. In equilibrium, the PMF owners distort the preferences of the external manager by means of a bonus-based incentive contract. In contrast, the owners of the Coop (the consumers) …nd it more bene…cial in terms of member value not to use high-powered incentives via a pro…t-and-sales based incentive contract, but rather rely on an internal member-manager who is paid a ‡at wage. Summarizing, our model demonstrates that if one focuses on the strategic impact, it is not indicated for a Coop to use the same type of compensation policy for its manager as a PMF. In terms of strategic interaction, the intuition is that a Coop, by recruiting an agent (e.g., a consumer-owner) whose preferences are aligned with the organizational objective, is per se highly expansionary in term of output. Therefore, the Coop does not need to rely on a manager who sets prices aggressively to expand market share and quantity. Furthermore, employing an external manager only interested in monetary rewards based on sales and pro…ts leads to distorted incentives with respect to the Coop's goal, which after all is the welfare of its members.
Summarizing, our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we show that Coops do not have strategic reasons to use incentive contracts when they can attract and recruit intrinsically motivated agents to run the …rm. This is of interest in the light of some recent trends in Coop management. For example, a research report of the Center of Cooperatives (see Lang 2002 ) based on responses of industry experts concluded that: "[e]xisting compensation programs are not seen as adequate to attract chief executives comparable to those of investor-oriented …rms.", and, "Cooperative management must have compensation programs adequate to attract chief executives comparable to those of investor-owned …rms." (p. 27). New generation Cooperatives and other hybrid organizational structures emerge and are competing head-to-head with pro…t-maximizing rival …rms (Katz and Boland 2002, Kopel and Brand 2012) , and therefore consider providing high-powered incentives to their managers as well. According to our results, the performance schemes in Coops should be adopted with great caution. Second, our paper complements a line of research which considers strategic incentives in mixed oligopolies with a public …rm or hybrid organizational structures (e.g. Kopel The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a mixed duopoly model with strategic delegation in which a Coop and a PMF compete in prices and supply di¤erentiated goods to consumers. Section 3 presents the main results of our paper. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
There are two goods, which are assumed to be provided by two heterogeneous …rms competing strategically in prices: one PMF selling good 1 and one Coop selling good 2. Both …rms have identical unit cost c, and cost functions are given by C(x k ) = cx k ; k = 1; 2. We assume a continuum of identical consumers h 2 I; with I = [0; 1], possessing quasi-linear preferences over two symmetrically di¤erentiated goods and a numeraire denoted by y. 6 For each h-th consumer, preferences are expressed by the following quadratic utility function
where > c and x h k (for k = 1; 2) denotes the individual consumption of the k-th good, and 2 (0; 1) the degree of product di¤erentiation (e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984) . Total quantities of the two products are denoted by x 1 and x 2 . If the available income of each consumer (denoted y h ) is su¢ ciently high, the inverse demands for both goods can be obtained by aggregating all consumers' …rst-order conditions for the maximization of (2.1) subject to their individual budget constraint
Here p 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) and p 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) denote the prices of the two goods. Carrying out this derivation in the usual way yields the following inverse demand functions
The direct demand system can be obtained by inverting (2.3) and writes as
In existing works on Coop behavior a variety of ad hoc objective functions have been assumed (see the comprehensive survey by Soboh et al. 2009 ). However, it can be argued that the objective function of a …rm should originate from microeconomic fundamentals (see Marini . The starting point for the derivation of the Coop objective function is that every consumer is assumed to receive a part of the Coop net pro…t proportional to this consumer's share of the good purchased. In consumer cooperatives this share usually takes the form of a patronage rebate paid on the members' purchases. Since in our model the Coop is assumed to act on behalf of all potential consumers of its products, it maximizes the joint utility of all its consumer-members subject to their budget constraints. As is shown below, by aggregating for all consumers, the objective function of the Coop corresponds to the maximization of total consumer welfare subject to the collective budget constraint (see also Marini and Zevi, 2011) . 7 More formally, at an interior solution where all consumers h 2 I are served by the two …rms, we have
Since in equilibrium the budget constraint is binding and the consumers have a mass of 1, the optimization problem can be simpli…ed as
where the utility function U (p) has the quadratic form given in (2.1). Thus, in this paper we will assume that the owners of the Coop make their decisions in order to maximize (2.5). 8 Concerning the PMF, we assume, as usual, that the owners pursue to maximize pro…t, i.e.
(2.6) max
The owners delegate the choice of prices to managers. We assume that both …rms can recruit (intrinsically motivated) internal managers whose preferences are aligned with those of the …rm. In the case of a Coop, we can think of a consumer-member who runs the …rm. This manager receives a …xed wage and is (intrinsically) motivated to maximize member utility V . In the case of a PMF, it might be an investor-manager who has an inventive to maximize pro…t . Alternatively, PMF and Coop can delegate the choice of prices to external managers. In the latter case, following the standard delegation model (e.g. Fershtman and Judd 1987 , Sklivas 1987 , Vickers 1985 , we assume that the managers of both the PMF and the Coop are compensated on the basis of pro…ts k = p k x k C k (x k ) and revenues R k = p k x k (k = 1; 2). 9 As is common in the strategic incentives literature, we assume that the two …rms o¤er the following linear pro…t-and-sales contract
with B k 0, where the incentive parameter k is chosen endogenously by each …rm's owner as part of the contract design. For k = 1, the contract is pro…t-based and for k = 0 the contract is sales revenue-based. The parameter A k denotes the …xed salary component of the contract and B k the weight which is put on the manager's variable compensation component.
Note that the manager's incentive for performance stems only from k , whereas the compensation parameters A k and B k are only chosen here to ful…ll the manager's reservation constraint U k U (the reservation utility U is obtained if the manager accepts a job outside the …rm). A manager will accept the contract if the reservation constraint is ful…lled and, being hired, the manager will select the price such that compensation is maximized.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the …rst stage, both …rms decide whether to delegate (D) the price choice to an externally recruited manager with preferences captured by (2.7) or, instead, hire an internal manager who is intrinsically motivated to pursue the goals of the company. The latter case corresponds to designate one of the owners or members as manager, set a zero bonus scheme and paying her a ‡at compensation package and we denote it by N D. At the second stage, in case an external manager is selected, each …rm determines the speci…c contract design o¤ered to the manager, i.e. the optimal values of k to maximize its own objective function, which is (2.5) for the Coop and (2.6) for the PMF. At the third and …nal stage, the …rms'managers will set the prices such that their own utility is maximized. The main question which we will study with this model is if in equilibrium the Coop owners have a strategic reason to delegate the …rm's control to an external manager and use an explicit incentive contract. All di¤erences in the choice to delegate and in the compensation structure, will emerge endogenously as a result of the di¤erent governance modes and the strategic interaction of the two …rms in the market. Moreover, assuming identical incentive contracts in PMFs and Coops enables us to compare the structures of the optimal compensation contracts of the two organizational modes.
Main Results
We organize our results in four di¤erent sections corresponding to the four di¤erent subgames (denoted N DN D, DN D, N DD and DD) of the delegation game. To obtain the main results of the paper, it is su¢ cient to solve the game by backward induction and analyze the decision taken by every …rm at the delegation stage.
3.1. Subgame NDND. It is helpful to start the analysis with the subgame in which both …rms do not delegate the control to an external manager (case N DN D) and use internal managers to run the …rm. We prove that in this case a Coop will always set in equilibrium a price equal to the marginal cost. The result is rather general and it is shown to hold for any consumer's quasilinear preference and for any production technology. Lemma 1. In the non-delegation subgame, the Coop always adopts a marginal cost pricing strategy.
Proof. By (2.5) and (2.3), the objective function of the Coop takes the general form of
The FOC for an interior solution of the maximization problem is
Since, @U @x k = p k ; for k = 1; 2;
expression (3.1) can be written as 
The meaning of Proposition 1 is that an internal (intrinsically motivated) Coop manager will naturally push the Coop's price down to marginal costs. Therefore, if the Coop possesses a constant-returns-to-scale technology, the best-reply will be inelastic to all price changes of the PMF. More speci…cally, using the utility and the cost speci…cation introduced above in (2.5), the FOC of the Coop manager at the price-setting stage can be written as: dV dp
Hence, the Coop sets p 2 = c, i.e. a price equal to its marginal costs, independent of the rival's price. On the other hand, the pro…t-maximizing …rm chooses p 1 such that the pro…t in (2.6) is maximized. Solving the …rst order condition yields the reaction function
Solving the system of reaction functions yields the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices
with the associated payo¤s
It is worth mentioning that this result corresponds to the insights reported by Ohnishi (2010), who considers a mixed oligopoly with foreign competition. In his setup, the public …rm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and pro…t of the domestic …rm. This results in an objective function similar to the Coop's objective of maximizing members'welfare subject to the budget constraint. Therefore, the two results coincide.
3.2. Subgame DND. Let us now turn to the subgame DN D, where only the pro…t-maximizing …rm delegates to an external manager and uses strategic incentives. Obviously, since the Coop sets its price equal to marginal costs independently of the rival's price (p 2 = c, see above), for the pro…t-maximizing rival the strategic e¤ect of delegating the price choice to an external manager is lost. The price of the Coop cannot be in ‡uenced. In fact, the PMF's best-reply is easily computed as
Solving the system of best-replies yields the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices
The pro…t of the PMF is
The owners of the PMF now choose the incentive parameter 1 to maximize 1 . This then yields
and shows that the PMF o¤ers a pro…t-based contract to its manager. 10 This result con…rms our reasoning that the PMF cannot gain from distorting the contract if it competes against a Coop, quite in contrast to the situation where two PMFs compete (e.g. Judd 1987, Sklivas 1987) . Using the optimal value of the incentive parameter, we can calculate the optimal prices
and the pro…ts and the member value in equilibrium
3.3. Subgame DD. If both …rms delegate their price decisions to an external manager and use incentive schemes, then the analysis becomes more interesting. Again, using the utility speci…cation introduced in (2.1), we can consider in detail the price choice of the managers. Rewriting the incentive-relevant parts of the compensation as U k = k +(1 k )cx k , k = 1; 2, the …rst order conditions of a manager at the price-setting stage can be written as
Solving the …rst order conditions leads to the price reaction functions
which shows that the best-replies have the usual form, are upward-sloping, and hence prices are strategic complements. Although the slope of the reaction functions remains unchanged, the owners of the …rms can use the incentive contract to shift the reaction function inwards ( k < 1) or outwards ( k > 1). Solving (3.4) yields (3.5)
Both …rms can use the managers as a commitment to increase prices. However, while this is in the interest of the owners of a pro…t-maximizing …rm, the owners of the Coop try to maximize the welfare of its members and therefore try to keep the prices low. These con ‡icting incentives of the owners can be seen as follows. Write the prices in (3.5) in the general form p 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) and p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ). Then …rst focus on the pro…t-maximizing …rm and write 1 (p 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) ; p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) = (p 1 c)x(p 1 ; p 2 ). The owners of …rm 1 select 1 such that the pro…t 1 is maximized which yields the …rst order condition
where we have used the …rst order condition (3.3) of the manager in the …rst term. Since for 1 = 1 the …rst term vanishes, but the second term is positive, the owners can increase the pro…t of …rm 1 by choosing a 1 > 1. Considering the manager's compensation, this corresponds to putting a higher weight on pro…t and a negative weight on sales revenue, which provides incentives for the manager to keep the price high. Now let us focus on the Coop. The owners of …rm 2 select the incentive contract for the manager to maximize the welfare of all members subject to the budget constraint which, as demonstrated above, is equal to maximizing the objective function V (x 1 (p 1 ( 1 ; 2 ); p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )); x 2 (p 1 ( 1 ; 2 ); p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ))) given in (2.5). The …rst order condition can be written as
Obviously, the …rst term vanishes. Recall that in the case where the owners of the Coop do not delegate the price choice to an external manager (subgames DN D and N DN D), they set the price equal to marginal cost, p 2 = c. In the expression above this would mean that also the second term vanishes. However, since the third term is negative and the expression in the brackets is also negative, in the case of delegation to an external manager the owners will choose the price below marginal cost. In other words, the Coop sets prices even more aggressively in the case of delegation. The resulting best-replies at the contracting stage are given by
Observe that the Coop best-reply is independent of the rival's choice of contract, whereas
the pro…t-maximizing …rm choice depends positively on the other …rm's contract parameter. Solving the …rst order condition at the contracting stage yields the following equilibrium bonus rates,
The resulting prices and payo¤s in equilibrium are
;
Note that p DD 2 < c and therefore
< 0. The Coop uses the manager to set its price under marginal costs and this results in negative pro…ts. This yields the following prices and payo¤s in equilibrium
Recall that in the DD-subgame the pro…t-maximizing …rm tries to keep the price high and selects 1 > 1. Since in the present subgame this countervailing e¤ect is missing, the Coop prices even more aggressively. It is easy to see that p N DD 2 < p DD 2 and consequently the loss is even higher than in the previous case.
3.5. The equilibrium of the game. At the …rst stage the Coop and the PMF are deciding if they want to hire an external manager who makes the price choice or use an internal (intrinsically motivated) manager instead. Using the payo¤s we have obtained for the four subgames yields the following payo¤ matrix: where A = ( c) 2 . It is easy to see that
for 2 (0; 1). Hence, in the mixed duopoly case the pro…t-maximizing …rm will always weakly prefer to delegate to an external manager. However, as we show at the end of this subsection, if there is another PMF rival active in the market, then the preference would be strict. This is in line with the literature on strategic incentive contracts. On the other hand, given that the pro…t-maximizer delegates, the cooperative will always prefer not to delegate the price choice to an external manager since V DN D > V DD for 2 (0; 1). Since V N DN D < V N DD , the unique non-trivial equilibrium of our game is DN D. In this equilibrium, the price of the pro…t-maximizing …rm is higher, p
= c, and consequently the sales of the Co-op are higher,
). It turns out that the pro…t-maximizing …rm nevertheless makes a higher pro…t than the consumer cooperative,
. These results are summarized in the following proposition. Proposition 1. For 2 (0; 1) the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the strategic delegation game played by a PMF and a Coop can be characterized as follows: (i) the PMF delegates the price choice to an external manager and writes an incentive contract based on pro…ts ( 1 = 1) whereas the Coop prefers to pay an internal (intrinsically motivated) manager a ‡at wage; (ii) the PMF charges a higher price (and sells a lower output) than the Coop; (iii) the PMF also earns a higher pro…t than the Coop.
Proof. By straightforward manipulation of prices and payo¤s in equilibrium.
In Figure 1 we provide a graphical illustration of the two cases, internal manager for the Coop versus external managers and pay-for-performance for both …rms. The lines denoted by p (p 1 ) represent the price best-replies in the case where the Coop uses an internal (intrinsically motivated) manager. Note that in the latter case, the manager sets the Coop's price equal to marginal costs independent of the PMF's price. The intersection point p DN D of the two lines gives the optimal price pair. The …gure also shows the corresponding iso-pro…t curves for the PMF ( ), whereas lower iso-utility curves correspond to higher utility levels for consumers (V DD < V DN D ).
[
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In the case where the Coop recruits an internal manager, the iso-utility curve V DN D has a maximum along the vertical price reaction function p DN D 2 (p 1 ). Likewise, the iso-pro…t curve
has a maximum at the location where it intersects the best-reply p
In the case where both …rms use variable incentive pay, this is di¤erent. To understand this, note that a manager's price reaction function only depends on the …rm's own incentive parameter k , but does not depend on the rival's incentive parameter (see (3.4) ). Therefore, in choosing the contract design for their own manager, the owners of each …rm takes the price best-reply of the rival as given and maximizes with respect to their …rm's objective function. Hence, the owner's maximization problem is akin to the optimization problem of a Stackelberg leader. Consequently, the iso-pro…t curve From a practical point of view, it seems surprising that the Coop does not bene…t from using an incentive contract, whereas the PMF does. To understand this better, note that there is perfect alignment between the goals of the owners and the manager for 1 = 1 and any deviation from this value would be made only for strategic reasons (see, in particular, the triopoly case below). In a Coop, the situation is di¤erent. Any explicit incentive contract has to rely on veri…able performance measures like (e.g.) pro…t and sales revenue, and this makes it impossible to obtain perfect goal congruence between the manager and the Coop by selecting the contract parameter 2 . In other words, the incentive contract used for compensating an external Coop manager immediately drives a wedge between the interest of the owners of the Coop and the external manager. As a consequence, the parameter 2 in the performance measure of a pro…t-and-sales-based incentive contract has to balance two goals: …rst, to align the interests of the two parties like in an agency setting and, second, to strategically in ‡uence the rival's price choices. It is worth mentioning that the outcome would change, if the Coop could somehow make the explicit contract contingent on di¤erent performance measures like the members'value (Kopel and Brand 2012, Bárcena-Ruiz 2009). Since this is hard to implement in practice, the Coop prefers to pay its internal manager a ‡at wage and relies on the manager's intrinsic motivation which achieves perfect alignment with the Coop's goal.
As a second point for the Coop's preference for recruiting an internal manager, observe that the equilibrium price levels of the PMF are identical in both subgames, i.e. p
In case the Coop pays a …xed compensation to its manager, this price level is obtained as a response to the Coop manager setting the price equal to marginal costs. In contrast, if the Coop uses an incentive contract, the external manager's price best-reply is upward-sloping (see (3.4) and Figure 1 ). The owners of the Coop now select the incentive parameter 2 such that the resulting equilibrium price level of the rival is the same as with …xed compensation. This choice of 2 shifts the manager's price best-reply inwards (since DD 2 < 1) and causes a decrease of the Coop's price below marginal cost. As a consequence, the consumption bundle of the members of the Coop changes. The demand for the PMF's product decreases whereas the demand for the Coop's product increases. However, overall this results in a lower member value V DD (and negative pro…t). Before concluding this section, we brie ‡y analyze the mixed triopoly case in which two PMFs use strategic incentive contracts while a Coop either pays its manager a ‡at wage or uses a variable bonus scheme (like the PMFs). Comparing the payo¤s, it is easy to see that for the Coop paying a ‡at wage constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the two-stage game. Moreover, we show that in this equilibrium every PMF selects an incentive parameter of > 1 to manipulate the rival PMF's price upward. We include the main results obtained for the case of two PMFs and one Coop in the following proposition. The proof is given in the Appendix. Proposition 2. For 2 (0; 1), the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of strategic delegation game played by two PMFs and one Coop can be characterized as follows: (i) the PMFs k = 1; 2 write a bonus contract for their managers with k > 1, whereas the Coop o¤ers the internal manager a …xed wage; (ii) the PMFs charge a higher price (and sell a lower output) than the Coop; (iii) the PMFs earn a higher pro…t than the Coop.
Concluding Remarks
In research and practice it has been a major issue to …nd the optimal structure of the compensation package for a …rm's management. Previous work has adopted a shareholder view and the pro…t-maximizing motive and has studied optimal incentive contracts which align the interest of the management with the …rm's shareholders. In recent years the focus in corporate governance has shifted and researchers are now trying to understand the relationship between the structure of optimal compensation packages, the characteristics of a …rm, and a …rm's performance (e.g. Matolcsy and Wright 2011, Eldenburg et al. 2004 ). For example, recent work has shown that socially concerned …rms, enterprises which also pursue non-pro…t motives, and other hybrid organizational forms (optimally) compensate their managers in a di¤erent way than their pro…t-maximizing rivals (e.g. Cai Deckop et al. 2006) . In this paper we have taken a theoretical approach and have presented a simpli…ed model of strategic incentives for traditional consumer cooperatives competing in a mixed duopoly against a pro…t-maximizing …rm. Competition was assumed à la Bertrand and goods were assumed to be di¤erentiated. The conclusion obtained by our model is that while for a pure pro…t-maximizing …rm it is optimal to hire an external manager interested in monetary compensation and rely on bonus-based incentive contracts to manipulate the manager's preferences, for the Coop it is optimal to employ a consumer-manager and pay her a ‡at wage, just relying on the consumer-manager's propensity to pursue the company goal. We believe that our …ndings are of interest in the light of more recent trends to re-organize Coop management and to move away from the traditional Coop orientation on member value to a more investor-focused hybrid Coop structure with a di¤erent objective (e.g. Katz and Boland 2002) . In such type of organizational structures, the use of incentive contracts of the type considered here might be more suitable since this type shares some features with a PMF. We leave this issue as a topic for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: The direct demands functions for the two PMFs (k = 1; 2) and the Coop (k = 3) competing in prices can be written as follows
where p k denotes the prices charged by …rm's k rivals. Let us …rst consider the subgame in which the Coop decides to recruit an internal manager while the PMFs recruit external managers. From Proposition 1 in the main text we know that in this case the Coop will always set a price equal to the marginal cost, i.e. p 3 (p 1 ; p 2 ) = c.
On the other hand, each PMF manager (k = 1; 2) selects the price to maximize compensation, which yields the following Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices: = 0. Now, let us assume that the Coop decides to pay its manager via a variable incentive scheme. In this case, all three managers set prices to maximize their own compensation. As a result, the following prices are obtained, At the …rst stage, the two PMFs (k = 1; 2) and the Coop (k = 3) simultaneously determine k to maximize 1 ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ), 2 ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) and V ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) respectively. Solving the …rst-order conditions yields the solutions for k = 1; 2. Consequently, if the Coop recruits an internal manager, both PMFs are less aggressive when setting the variable incentive scheme for their managers.
